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Criminal Law
by Thomas D. Church*
I. INTRODUCTION

*Trial Attorney, Pate, Johnson & Church, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University
(B.A., 2012); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2017). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Tom is also the author of thefederaldocket.com, a law blog dedicated to highlighting
noteworthy criminal opinions and news in criminal law across the country.
1. 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2020).
3. Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc), overruled by
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319.
4. 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2020).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2020); Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194.
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Last year was another busy year for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. While the court continued developing federal criminal law within the circuit, the court was also forced to adjust
its own precedents in light of several landmark opinions by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In United States v. Davis,1 for example, the Supreme Court struck
down the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),2 thus overruling the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in Ovalles v. United States.3 Another one
of the Supreme Court's most noteworthy opinions came on appeal directly
from the Eleventh Circuit in Rehaif v. United States,4 where a majority
of the Court held that a defendant must have knowledge of his unlawful
status to be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)5 or 924(a)(2).6
This Article explains how the Eleventh Circuit has adapted its case
law in response to these rulings. Just as importantly, it provides a comprehensive review of the court's other published opinions covering criminal law in 2019, with a focus on the key holdings from each decision. Section II of this Article reviews opinions addressing substantive offenses,
such as fraud, violent crimes, and drug offenses. Section III covers criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional issues arising in
criminal prosecutions, and Section IV reviews opinions discussing the
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proper application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This Article
does not cover post-conviction proceedings.
II. SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
A. Economic Offenses

937 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1353.
827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016).
Waters, 937 F.3d at 1352 (citing Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310).
Id. at 1352–53 (citations omitted).
See id. at 1348–49.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1354.
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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The Eleventh Circuit's 2019 docket covered a variety of fraud offenses
and other economic crimes. One of the court's most noteworthy opinions
came in United States v. Waters,7 where the court reviewed the trial
court's jury instructions distinguishing between a mere "scheme to deceive" and the type of "scheme to defraud" necessary to prove wire fraud. 8
Waters involved a substantial discussion of the court's 2016 opinion in
United States v. Takhalov,9 in which the court held that there was insufficient evidence of wire fraud where the defendant bar owners failed to
disclose to customers that they had hired women to pose as tourists and
lure them to their nightclubs.10 In Takhalov, the court held that the defendants had only carried out a scheme to deceive, rather than defraud,
because the defendants had not intended to harm the victims, thus drawing a line between "schemes that do no more than cause their victims to
enter into transactions that they would otherwise avoid . . . and schemes
that depend for their completion on a misrepresentation of an essential
element of the bargain."11
In Waters, the defendant tried to obtain a loan by sending a private
lender a fake letter purporting to reflect the IRS approving a payment
plan for the defendant's outstanding federal taxes. 12 The defendant argued that the letter wasn't material, that the loan would have been approved anyway, and that he was entitled to a jury instruction that distinguished between a scheme to deceive and a scheme to defraud, where
one intends to cause harm, though the defendant's proposed instructions
failed to define what constitutes "harm."13 The court affirmed the district
court's refusal to instruct the jury and clarified that a scheme to defraud
includes a defendant's intent to cause harm by lying "about the nature of
the bargain itself."14 In affirming the defendant's conviction, the court
concluded:
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In a scheme to deceive, the victim of the lie hasn't been harmed because he still received what he paid for. But in a scheme to defraud,
the victim has been harmed because the misrepresentation affected
the nature of the bargain, either because the perpetrator lied about
the value of the thing (for example, promising something costs $10
when it actually costs $20), or because he lied about the thing itself
(for example, promising a gemstone is a diamond when it is actually a
cubic zirconium).15

Id.
940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1197–98.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1203–06.
Id. at 1204.
913 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1329.
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In addition to clarifying the elements of wire fraud, the court also issued an opinion addressing the elements of honest-services fraud when
such a charge is predicated on bribery. In United States v. Van Buren,16
the court reviewed whether the defendant, a police officer, had committed
an "official act" when, in exchange for a loan from a criminal he was familiar with, the defendant searched a law enforcement database in order
to tip off the criminal regarding the existence of an undercover officer. 17
The defendant was convicted of honest-services fraud after the trial
court refused to instruct the jury that a bribe must be given in exchange
for the performance of an "official act," such as a "lawsuit, hearing, or
administrative determination."18 On appeal, the court reversed, explaining that the trial court's refusal to include this analogy was not a harmless error since an official act "must involve the formal exercise of governmental power," and without further explanation, the trial court's
instructions defined "official act" too broadly.19 There was no "official act"
here based on the defendant sharing information from the database because he was "merely divulging information to a civilian," and the Government had not identified a pending investigation or formal matter that
the defendant could influence through an official act. 20
The court also issued important opinions regarding bank fraud and
identity fraud. In United States v. Munksgard,21 the defendant was convicted of bank fraud and aggravated identity theft after making false
statements on several loan applications indicating that he had contracts
with several companies in order to bolster his eligibility for a loan. 22 On
appeal, he argued that, even if he had made false statements on the bank
loans, the Government failed to prove that the bank in question was
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Id. at 1331.
See id. at 1336.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1329.
18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2020).
Munksgard, 913 F.3d at 1333.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
922 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1235.
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FDIC-insured, a necessary element of federal bank fraud. 23 Over Judge
Tjoflat's dissent,24 and despite the fact that there was absolutely no direct
evidence at trial that the bank was FDIC-insured at the time of the offense, the majority affirmed the defendant's conviction, "albeit reluctantly."25
The court held that, in the light most favorable to the verdict, there
was sufficient evidence of the bank's insured status at the time of the
offense based on the Government presenting evidence (1) that the bank
was insured when it was initially chartered in 1990, twenty-three years
before the offense; (2) that the bank was insured at the time of trial; and
(3) that the bank wasn't required to renew its FDIC certificate often. 26
The court explained that this circumstantial evidence was "good enough"
to support an inference that the bank was insured at the time of trial. 27
Still, the majority made sure to use some colorful language in issuing a
"warning to federal prosecutors" that they are "cruisin' for a bruisin'" if
they continue failing to present contemporaneous evidence of a bank's
insured status in bank fraud trials.28
The panel in Munksgard also took a close look at aggravated identity
theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A,29 specifically the element requiring proof
that the defendant "used" another person's means of identification. 30 The
defendant argued that he had not "used" his employee's identity by forging the employee's name on a fake contract that he submitted with the
loan application because he had never purported to be the employee or
otherwise act on his behalf.31 The court rejected the defendant's narrow
definition of "use" and held that the plain and "ordinary meaning" of the
word only requires that the defendant employs, puts into action, or avails
himself of another's identity "for the accomplishment of some purpose." 32
Another identity fraud opinion came in United States v. Delva,33 where
the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of unauthorized access devices and aggravated identity theft. 34 First, the court held
that there was sufficient evidence supporting the conviction on the access
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Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1250.
Id.
939 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1222, 1224.
Id. at 1221–22.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1225–26.
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device counts, noting that the defendant was seen by an undercover informant in a townhouse where fraudulent activity was being undertaken,
and was seen surrounded by laptops, documents listing personally identifying information, debit cards, and fraudulent tax documents, which
were mixed along with his own personal items and contained his fingerprints.35 The defendant had also made statements to law enforcement
indicating that he knew the personal information and debit cards were
being used to commit identity theft and tax fraud. 36
The court also affirmed the defendant's conviction for aggravated identity theft, rejecting the defendant's argument that the Government failed
to prove the defendant knew "that the means of identification at issue
belonged to another person."37 While there was no direct evidence of the
defendant's knowledge, the court held that a jury could infer knowledge
from a defendant's use of a victim's information to fraudulently obtain
refunds from the IRS, which verifies the information and matches it to a
real person before issuing a refund.38 The court added that a defendant's
knowledge can also be inferred by the origin of the personal information
being used, which in this case came from the records of a state agency. 39
The court also took a look at the elements of bankruptcy fraud. In
United States v. Annamalai,40 the court reversed the defendant's convictions for bankruptcy fraud.41 The defendant had operated a Hindu temple, referred to by prosecutors as a "scam," that took donations and credit
card transactions for "spiritual services."42 When the first temple went
bankrupt, a bankruptcy trustee was appointed and quickly shut down
the temple.43 Undeterred, the defendant opened a new temple, serving
largely the same congregation and providing the same spiritual services.44 The Government alleged that the defendant's operation of the
second temple constituted bankruptcy fraud because he concealed the
second temple's profits from the bankruptcy trustee, and these profits
should have been considered part of the first temple's bankruptcy estate.45
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On appeal, the court disagreed with the Government's "alter ego theory" that the first and second temple were "one and the same," and were
thus part of the same bankruptcy estate.46 Likening the case to corporate
law, the court held that a bankruptcy estate is "separate and distinct
from the corporate debtor" and that the Government must "pierce the
corporate veil," which the Government failed to do here.47
In United States v. Harris,48 the court reviewed the elements of Hobbs
Act extortion in a case where the defendant, a prison guard, had been
confiscating contraband items from inmates for his own personal use.49
Specifically at issue was whether there was sufficient evidence that the
inmates had "consented" to the confiscation of their property, as opposed
to a forceful and non-consensual taking, where the defendant had obtained the items by "shak[ing] down" the inmates and threatening to report them unless they stayed quiet.50 The court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence that the inmates had consented to giving their contraband items to the defendant because, though they feared the defendant
would report them if they refused, they "'retain[ed] some degree of choice
in whether to comply with the extortionate threat' because they could
have reported" the defendant or refused to participate in his "extortionate scheme."51
B. Violent Crimes

05/29/2020 07:30:56

46. Id. at 1230–31.
47. Id.
48. 916 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2019).
49. Id. at 951.
50. Id. at 954. Extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2020) is defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”
51. Harris, 916 F.3d at 957–58 (quoting United States v. Xiao, 428 F.3d 361, 371 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2020).
53. 918 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2019) (denying rehearing en banc).
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The Eleventh Circuit's most significant opinions addressing violent
crimes came in its opinions defining "crimes of violence" under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA).52 In United States v. St. Hubert,53 for example, a majority of the Eleventh Circuit declined to hear the case en
banc, leaving in place its prior panel holding that attempted Hobbs Act
robbery, and perhaps attempts to commit other violent offenses, are
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crimes of violence under the ACCA. 54 In United States v. Harris,55 the
court reiterated that "[i]t makes no difference that [the defendant] was
convicted of only attempting [a violent felony]" and held that the defendant's Alabama conviction for attempted first-degree assault was a crime
of violence under the ACCA's element clause when the defendant acted
intentionally and not recklessly.56
The court also issued an important opinion that has since been vacated
while pending a rehearing en banc.57 The court vacated its prior panel
opinion in United States v. Moss,58 where the panel held that a conviction
for aggravated assault under Georgia law does not qualify as a "crime of
violence" under the elements clause of the ACCA. 59 The panel reasoned
that "a conviction predicated on a mens rea of recklessness does not satisfy the 'use of physical force' requirement . . . . Rather, for a conviction
to qualify as a predicate crime of violence under the elements clause, it
must require 'the intentional use of force.'"60
Apart from its opinions further interpreting the scope of the ACCA,
the court in United States v. Gillis61 considered the various approaches
for defining a crime of violence as applied to the defendant's conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 37362 for soliciting another to commit the crime of kidnapping.63 Citing Eleventh Circuit precedent and similar language in 18
U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(3)(A)64, the court first held that it was
bound to apply the categorical approach in determining whether the defendant's conviction for solicitation of another to commit a crime of violence itself constituted a "crime of violence" under § 373.65
Under the categorical approach, rather than looking at the actual conduct of the defendant's crime, which in Gillis involved physical violence,
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 36 Side A
05/29/2020 07:30:56

54. Id. at 1211–12 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion’s conclusion
that “an attempt to commit a crime should be treated as an attempt to commit every element of that crime.”).
55. 941 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 2019).
56. Id. at 1056–57 (quoting Hylor v. United States 896 F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th Cir.
2018)).
57. United States v. Moss, 928 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2019).
58. 920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2019), vacated en banc, 928 F.3d 1340.
59. Id. at 759.
60. Id. at 756–57 (quoting United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1336 (11th
Cir. 2010)).
61. 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2012).
63. Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1195–96.
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3)(A) (2020).
65. Id. at 1199 (citing United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1336–37 (11th Cir.
2013)).
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courts must look at the elements of the solicited crime underlying the
§ 373 charge, in this case kidnapping, and determine whether the underlying crime has an element requiring "'the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force' against another person or property." 66 Applying the categorical approach to kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)67,
and citing sister circuits and Supreme Court precedent, the court held
that "§ 1201(a) can be violated without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force . . . as required by § 373's force clause."68 Accordingly, the court reversed the defendant's § 373 conviction because it
was not based on an underlying crime of violence. 69
C. Drug Offenses

05/29/2020 07:30:56

66. Id. at 1202–03.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2020).
68. Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1203–10 (citing United States v. Jenkins, 849 F.3d 390, 393–94
(7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 203–04 (4th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 344–45 (9th Cir. 1988); Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455,
460–62 (1946)).
69. Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1210.
70. 936 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019).
71. Id. at 1295.
72. Id. at 1299.
73. Id. at 1300.
74. Id. at 1304.
75. Id.
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There were two especially noteworthy opinions concerning drug offenses published by the Eleventh Circuit in 2019. The first, United States
v. Feldman,70 involved a pill mill in Florida operated by a doctor and his
wife.71 Among other things, the defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to exclude the Government's expert's testimony, which included his
opinion as to all 3,000-plus of the defendant's patient files based on an
extrapolation from only a small number of files. 72 The court rejected the
defendant's claim under plain error review, despite the fact that the defendant had filed a motion in limine to limit the Government's expert's
testimony regarding his conclusion based on his extrapolation, explaining that the magistrate had not made a "definitive ruling on the extrapolation issue."73
The defendant also challenged the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury on the physician's "duty and obligation to try to relieve a patient's
pain."74 The defendant's proposed instruction described an "ethical and
medically justifiable" obligation for a physician to prescribe a controlled
substance to a pain patient "even if the patient has developed a tolerance
or addiction to those substances."75 The court held that this instruction

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 37 Side A
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Id. at 1305.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2020).
Feldman, 936 F.3d at 1308.
Id. at 1308–10.
Id. at 1318.
571 U.S. 204 (2014).
Feldman, 936 F.3d at 1310–15 (citing Burrage, 571 U.S. 204).
Id. at 1320–21 (citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)).
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2020).
Feldman, 936 F.3d at 1321–22.
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was argumentative, not an accurate statement of law, and that it was up
to the defendant to explain that theory to the jury. 76
Perhaps the most important part of the opinion, however, addressed
the sufficiency of evidence regarding the death counts in the indictment
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)77 and whether the Government had sufficiently
proved that the doctor defendant's prescriptions were the but-for cause
of each victim's death.78 First, the court held that there was sufficient
evidence that the defendant was the source of the drugs that caused the
overdose deaths, noting that the specific type of substances prescribed by
the defendant were in the victims' systems at their time of death, the
bottles for the pills were found in the victims' homes at the time of death,
and the prescriptions were issued a week or less before each death. 79
The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
drugs prescribed by the defendant were the but-for cause of each victim's
death.80 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the Government was required to prove that the defendant's drugs were the "sole" or
"independent" cause of the victim's death, and in a lengthy discussion of
the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States,81 the court concluded that the defendant's Schedule II prescriptions were the but-for
cause of death because, even though the victims had ingested other drugs
that exacerbated the effects of the Schedule II drugs, the victims would
not have died if they hadn't ingested the Schedule II drugs. 82
However, the court also concluded that there was a fatal flaw in the
special verdict form given to the jury, as the verdict form failed to specifically identify which drugs prescribed by the defendant caused the patients' deaths and thus "failed to establish that the jury actually found
that the Schedule II drugs were the but-for causes of the victims'
deaths."83 Since the jury had not properly found that the defendant's
Schedule II drugs caused the victims' deaths as alleged, he could not be
subjected to an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C),84 and the court
reversed the district court's application of the statute's twenty-year mandatory minimum.85
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The court issued another important opinion in United States v.
Achey,86 a case involving a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and fentanyl
analogues.87 The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the
Government had failed to prove at trial that the alleged conspiracy specifically involved fentanyl or DMT (another highly regulated drug), which
were identified by name in the indictment. 88 The indictment alleged that
the defendant knowingly distributed "a controlled substance analogue
that was intended for human consumption, which violation involved a
mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of . . ." fentanyl
and DMT, and was therefore punished under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).89
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that the Government was only required to prove a conspiracy to distribute a generic
controlled substance and that referring to a specific substance in the indictment "does not necessarily put the government to the burden of proving a conspiracy to distribute the specific controlled substance." 90 Rather,
in this case, the reference to the specific controlled substance could be
"fairly read to apply to the sentencing enhancement provision of the statute and not to the elements of the offense."91 The court conceded, however, that the Government's burden would be different "if the indictment
charges a specific type of drug in the place of the generic drug element of
the offense."92
D. Sex Offenses

943 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id. at 914.
916 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 2019).
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (2020).
Caniff, 916 F.3d at 930.
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The court issued important decisions defining the elements of different
sex offenses involving minors and explaining the different ways in which
district courts can calculate restitution to victims of child pornography.
In United States v. Caniff,93 the court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of making a notice or advertisement of
child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)94 based solely on his text
messages to an undercover officer, who he believed was a minor, requesting nude pictures.95
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The majority of the panel reasoned that the word "notice" simply
means "a written or printed announcement," that the defendant's request
for pictures did not have to be communicated to the general public or a
group of people in order to constitute an "announcement," 96 and that the
defendant's "individually directed text messages" to the officer each constituted a notice.97 Judge Newsom dissented, arguing that the majority's
interpretation of the word "notice" was "just not how people talk" and
that the definition should be limited to the context of printing or publishing, not "private, person-to-person text messages."98
In United States v. Whyte,99 the court reviewed the elements of sex
trafficking of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a),100 which generally requires that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the age of the victim. 101 In affirming the defendants' convictions, the court held that, under
§ 1591(c),102 the Government does not need to prove the defendant's mens
rea as to the victim's age so long as the defendant "had a reasonable opportunity to observe" the victim. 103 Here, the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim during the two months that they
lived and hung out together.104
Meanwhile, the court in United States v. Stahlman105 held that there
was sufficient evidence of the defendant's intent and a "substantial step"
to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)106 for attempting to
entice a minor.107 The court held that the jury was not required to accept
the defendant's explanations that he believed he was playing out a fantasy with an adult, and the court further held that the defendant's sexually explicit conversations with the undercover officer, who was posing
42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 38 Side A
05/29/2020 07:30:56

96. Id. at 933.
97. Id. at 936.
98. Id. at 941 (Newsom, J., dissenting). The court has since revisited this opinion sua
sponte, where it vacated Caniff’s conviction and held that, as under Caniff’s circumstances,
“private, person-to-person text messages asking an individual he thought was a minor to
send him sexually explicit pictures of herself cannot support a conviction for ‘making’ a
‘notice’ to receive child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)” United States v.
Caniff, No. 17-12410, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 11160 (11th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020).
99. 928 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2019).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2020).
101. Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1322.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2020).
103. Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1322 (citing United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th
Cir. 2014)).
104. Id. at 1331.
105. 934 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2020).
107. Stahlman, 934 F.3d at 1226.
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Id. at 1225–26.
Id. at 1223–24.
923 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1323.
572 U.S. 434 (2014).
Rothenberg, 923 F.3d at 1314 (citing Paroline, 572 U.S. 434).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1333.
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as the minor victim's father, and his act of driving to meet with them to
engage in sexual activity was sufficient evidence of attempting to entice
a minor.108 The court warned, however, that the agent's testimony discussing "flagged posts on Craigslist" and interpreting the defendant's
electronic statements veered on specialized testimony that would have
required qualifying the agent as an expert, though in this case, the error
in admitting his testimony without qualification would have been harmless.109
The court also issued a helpful opinion reflecting the wide discretion
that district courts have in awarding restitution to victims in child pornography cases. In United States v. Rothenberg,110 the court reviewed a
restitution order mandating that the defendant pay restitution to nine
victims depicted in the images he possessed. 111 Guided by the Supreme
Court's decision in Paroline v. United States,112 which set a standard of
proximate causation and required adjusting a restitution award based on
the defendant's "relative role" in causing the victim's loss, the Government and the defendant argued over the proper way to calculate the defendant's restitution obligation. 113
The defendant argued that the district court should have begun its
calculation by "disaggregating" the victim's losses among distributors,
producers, and possessors before determining his restitution obligation.114 The district court instead adopted the Government's preferred
method, dubbed the "1/n method," wherein the court "would divide the
total amount of each victim's losses by the number of defendants, across
multiple prosecutions, who had been ordered to pay restitution to the victim" and then exercise its discretion to calculate the restitution amount
based on the defendant's relative role.115
On appeal, the court held that "a district court is not required to determine, calculate, or disaggregate the specific amount of loss caused by
the original abuser-creator or distributor of child pornography before it
can decide the amount of the victim's losses caused by the later defendant
who possesses and views the images."116 The court emphasized the broad
discretion that district courts have in determining a defendant's
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restitution obligation but cautioned in a footnote that a "strict 1/n approach," without considering the defendant's relative role, would likely
fail to meet the "individualized assessment requirement of Paroline."117
E. Firearm Offenses

Id. at 1335 n.8.
United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Rehaif, 139 S. Ct.
941 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1019–20.
Id. at 1021–22.
920 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1311–12.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1308–09.
Id. at 1308.
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The court issued a pair of important opinions regarding firearm offenses in 2019, including an opinion on remand from the Supreme Court
after the landmark holding in Rehaif v. United States.118 In United States
v. Reed,119 the court was tasked with determining whether the defendant's conviction should be reversed because, based on Rehaif, it was plain
error where the defendant's indictment failed to allege, the jury was not
instructed to find, and the Government was not required to prove "that
[the defendant] knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm." 120
The court agreed that these errors were plain in light of Rehaif but ultimately affirmed the conviction after finding that the defendant's rights
were not substantially affected, citing Reed's eight prior felonies, his stipulation with the Government, and his testimony that he knew he was not
supposed to have a gun.121
The court issued another significant opinion governing firearm offenses in United States v. Vereen,122 where the court held that the "innocent transitory possession" defense is not available for defendants
charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.123 The defendant had requested that the jury be instructed "that his faultless and brief
possession of the a firearm did not constitute 'possession' under
§ 922(g)(1)."124 On appeal, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction
and explained that the text of the statute, which "only requires that the
possession be knowing," establishes § 922(g) as a general intent crime—
"the purpose behind a defendant's possession is irrelevant." 125 The court
also noted that the innocent transitory possession offense would be "extremely difficult to administer" as a practical matter.126
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F. Civil Rights Offenses
The court published a noteworthy opinion regarding police brutality in
United States v. Brown,127 where the defendant police officer kicked,
punched, and tased the occupants of a car after a high-speed chase and
the defendant's supervisor helped him cover it up. 128 After being convicted at trial for deprivation of rights under color of law under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242,129 the defendant officer argued that there was insufficient evidence
supporting his conviction because his use of force was reasonable given
the victim's active resistance, and he did not act willfully.130
On appeal, the court disagreed, noting that a jury must "weigh the
quantum of force employed against the severity of the crime at issue;
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight." 131 Here, the evidence reflected that
the only thing the victim did to merit the officer's use of force was that
he failed to comply with the officer's verbal demands, though the evidence
also indicated that the victim may not have even had a chance to comply
before being beaten and tased.132 The court also noted that resisting arrest without violence does not merit an officer punching, kicking, and
tasing the suspect and that the officer began using force against the victim "within seconds" of arriving at the vehicle. 133
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
A. Fourth Amendment Issues

934 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1285.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2020).
Brown, 934 F.3d at 1294–95.
Id. at 1295 (citing Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir. 2017)).
Id. at 1295–96.
Id. at 1296.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
921 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2019).
See id.
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The court broke ground in several cases involving the Fourth Amendment134 and its protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Perhaps the most significant opinion came in the court's en banc decision
in United States v. Johnson,135 which spawned one majority opinion, two
concurring opinions, and three dissenting opinions. 136 In Johnson, the
court reversed the prior panel opinion finding that the officer exceeded

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 40 Side A

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[4] CRIMINAL CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/20/2020 8:29 AM

CRIMINAL LAW

981

05/29/2020 07:30:56

137. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
138. Johnson, 921 F.3d at 995.
139. Id. at 997.
140. Id. at 998.
141. Id. at 1001.
142. Id. at 998.
143. Id.
144. 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
145. United States v. Campbell, 912 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Rodriguez,
135 S. Ct. 1609).
146. Id. at 1352–53 (citing United States v. Griffin, 696 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2012)).
147. Id. at 1354–55.
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the scope of a permissible Terry137 frisk when he reached into the defendant's pocket to remove a round of ammunition and an empty holster.138
The panel had held that the officer's conduct did not fall under the exception for officer safety, which allows for the seizure of weapons found during a frisk.139
In reversing the panel's opinion, the majority of the court sitting en
banc held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers were
justified in seizing the bullet and holster under the exception for officer
safety given the fact that they were in a high crime area at night, the
firearm for the bullet had not been found yet, and there were likely accomplices nearby.140 The court disregarded the fact that the defendant
was in handcuffs while he was being frisked, noting that "handcuffs do
not always work."141 Curiously, the court added that removing the bullet
from the defendant's pocket could help the officers identify the kind of
gun that might be nearby, though the court acknowledged that a frisk
cannot be used to "gather evidence."142 Regarding the defendant's argument that "ammunition, by itself, posed no danger," the court responded
that this failed "to appreciate the grave injury that could have been
caused by his ammunition if it had been loaded into a gun," though no
gun had been found on or near the defendant.143
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. United
States,144 the court also broke ground in redefining what constitutes an
unlawfully prolonged traffic stop. 145 In doing so, the court overruled its
prior precedent holding that a stop is unlawfully prolonged if the length
of the stop is "overall unreasonable," holding now that the proper inquiry
is whether the duration of the stop is "longer than necessary to complete
its mission" and that a stop is unlawfully prolonged "when an officer,
without reasonable suspicion, diverts from the stop's purpose and adds
time to the stop in order to investigate other crimes."146
Here, the officers prolonged the traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle
without reasonable suspicion.147 While the initial stop was valid, and the
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Id.
Id. at 1356.
940 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
917 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1296–97.
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officer's questions relating to the defendant's travel plans were relevant
to his traffic violation, the officer's questions regarding whether there
were counterfeit items, alcohol, drugs, or dead bodies in the car were not
based on any reasonable suspicion and added twenty-five seconds to the
stop, making the stop unlawful.148 The court held that suppression was
not warranted, however, under the good faith exception. 149
In contrast, in United States v. Bishop,150 the court rejected the defendant's challenge to the traffic stop. 151 Law enforcement officers conducted a traffic stop of the defendant after he ran a stop sign and after a
woman they arrested for drug possession told them that she was heading
to the defendant's house. Based on the woman's statement and the defendant's reputation as a drug dealer (one officer knew him as a prior
inmate at the county jail), the officers called for a drug dog and proceeded
to pat down the passenger while the defendant told the officers they had
"no right to stop us." One of the officers later testified that the defendant
was agitated and "fidgeting around" and kept arguing with the officers
before eventually complying with their requests for him to exit the vehicle. When the defendant eventually exited the car, the officers patted him
down and found a firearm; meanwhile, the K-9 gave a positive alert, and
the officers found drugs in the car. 152 On appeal from his conviction, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him.153
The court issued several other decisions implicating the Fourth
Amendment as applied to traffic stops and vehicle searches. In United
States v. Gibbs,154 the court considered whether officers had lawfully detained the defendant during a traffic stop where he was not the driver,
not in the driver's vehicle, nor suspected of criminal activity.155 Officers
arrived at the scene where an Audi had pulled into oncoming traffic and
come to a stop next to another car that was parked on the shoulder of the
road. The driver of the Audi and the defendant were standing between
the two cars when officers arrived, and the manner in which the officers
approached them essentially trapped them there. The officers arrived
with their guns drawn, wearing tactical vests with POLICE written on
the front, the lights of their cars activated, and as they approached, the
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Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1296–97.
922 F.3d at 1243–44.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
United States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1283.
935 F.3d 1279.
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defendant put his hands up and informed the officers that he had a firearm on his person.156
On appeal for the defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon, the court held that the defendant had indeed been detained, though as part of a lawful traffic stop and not a Terry stop as the
district court had held.157 The court also held that the defendant's detention was justified given his proximity to the driver and the car, the brief
time period before he made incriminating statements, and the officers'
reasonable uncertainty regarding who was the driver of the car. 158
The court's opinion in United States v. Delva addressed whether law
enforcement officers had probable cause to search the defendant's Mercedes based on their suspicion that the defendants were engaged in identity theft and tax fraud. 159 The court held that probable cause supported
the warrantless search—a confidential source had informed the agents
that the defendants were conducting identity theft out of their townhouse
and took pictures and video of a box in the townhouse containing numerous debit cards and documents with personal identifying information.160
The agents also witnessed one of the defendants removing several shoeboxes from the townhouse and loading them in the Mercedes and, when
they executed a search warrant for the townhouse, they saw a box of debit
cards in the car.161
Aside from traffic stops, the Eleventh Circuit in 2019 became the latest
Court of Appeals, the eleventh to be specific, to rule on the constitutionality of the "NIT warrant," a warrant issued by a magistrate judge in the
Eastern District of Virginia that authorized a "nationwide, remote-access
computer search" as part of a child pornography investigation. 162 The FBI
gained control of a notorious child pornography distribution website
called Playpen, and, after securing the warrant, deployed a malware program through the website that installed itself on the website visitor's
computer and transmit user information back to the FBI.163
In United States v. Taylor,164 the court first held that the malware's
extraction and transmission of user information constitutes a "search"
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Id. at 1284.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
Taylor, 935 F.3d at 1286.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1293 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id.
941 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
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under the Fourth Amendment.165 The court also held that the malware
was not a permissible "tracking device" as authorized under Rule 41(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,166 and as such, that the magistrate violated Rule 41(b) by issuing a warrant authorizing a search outside her district.167 The court further held that, because the magistrate
had exceeded her jurisdiction, the warrant was "void at issuance," making the ensuing search "effectively warrantless" in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.168 The court concluded, however, that suppression was not
warranted under the good faith exception since the exclusionary rule "is
concerned with deterring officer misconduct and punishing officer culpability—not with setting judges straight." 169 Judge Tjoflat dissented, arguing that the officials assured the magistrate that the search would occur within the district when they "knew or should have known that there
was an issue with jurisdiction and that the search would occur outside
the district."170 To allow such conduct, he wrote, "makes a mockery of the
warrant process."171
The court also addressed some of the problems that arise regarding
the all-important issue of standing in the Fourth Amendment context. In
United States v. Ross,172 the court considered its prior precedent and, despite "misgivings" about its correctness, held that the Government had
not waived its ability to contest Fourth Amendment standing for appellate purposes since "the issue isn't waivable." 173 Regarding law enforcement's initial warrantless entry into the defendant's motel room, the
court held that the defendant had standing to contest the search and had
not "abandoned" his reasonable expectation of privacy in his motel room
when he fled from law enforcement upon their arrival. 174 Though the defendant had fled from the police when they arrived at his room, the court
noted that motel rooms are more like residences than automobiles,
thereby meriting stronger Fourth Amendment protection, and the defendant here had locked his room, kept his key with him, kept his car in
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Id. at 1067–68.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068–69.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1069–70.
920 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2019).
924 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2019).
Cooks, 920 F.3d at 737.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 748 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
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the parking lot, and only ten minutes had elapsed between his flight and
the officers' warrantless search.175
After the court found that the defendant had standing, it held that the
officers' warrantless entry, during which they conducted a protective
sweep and seized a firearm, was a lawful sweep and seizure. 176 The court
reasoned that the officers had several outstanding arrest warrants when
they arrived at the motel room and had a reasonable belief that the defendant had returned to his room after initially fleeing from them. 177
Turning to the second search by law enforcement, however, after they
came back with a search warrant, the court concluded that the defendant
lacked standing to challenge the this search. 178 Though the defendant
had standing to challenge the officers' initial entry and warrantless
search, the officers did not execute the search warrants until after the
defendant's "checkout time" of 11:00 A.M., after which his reasonable expectation of privacy in the room had expired.179
In United States v. Cooks180 and United States v. Babcock,181 the court
also looked at warrantless searches. In Cooks, the defendant challenged
law enforcement's warrantless search of a crawlspace in his house following his arrest after a stand-off.182 The court held that, while the search
was not warranted as a protective sweep incident to an arrest, it was
justified under the "emergency-aid aspect of the exigent-circumstances
doctrine," given the officers' reasonable belief that hostages were in the
crawlspace, and because the search was "strictly circumscribed" and
"took no longer than necessary to verify the crawlspace was empty." 183
The dissent pointed out that there was no evidence indicating that anyone was in the crawlspace, "let alone that someone there was in immediate danger," and noted that none of the officers ever called down into the
crawl space to determine whether someone was there.184
Meanwhile, in Babcock, the court held that the officers' seizure of the
defendant's phone after a domestic disturbance, after which law enforcement held on to it for two days before eventually getting a search warrant, was not a permissible Terry stop of the phone, but rather a
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full-blown seizure.185 The court acknowledged that law enforcement had
a compelling interest in seizing the phone based on their well-founded
suspicions that it contained evidence of child pornography, but held that
the duration and intrusiveness of the search, coupled with law enforcement's lack of diligence in seeking a warrant sooner, went beyond a valid
Terry stop.186
However, the court held that the officers did have probable cause to
believe the phone contained evidence of a crime and that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless seizure of the phone. 187 The officers arrived at the house based on a domestic disturbance call, saw a girl at the
defendant's camper with cuts on her leg after the defendant denied anyone else's presence, were told by the defendant that he and the girl had
consumed drugs and alcohol at a party the night before, and, among other
things, were shown videos of the girl on the defendant's phone.188 Exigent
circumstances supported seizing the phone since the defendant could
have deleted any of the incriminating evidence before officers could obtain a warrant.189
B. Fifth Amendment Issues

Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1184.
Id. at 1190–92.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1192–93.
Id. at 1195.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
941 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2019).
Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1098.
Id. at 1097–98.
Id. at 1098.
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The court published a few noteworthy opinions involving various types
of Fifth Amendment190 claims. In United States v. Ochoa,191 for example,
the court held that the officers did not violate Miranda192 by questioning
the defendant before advising him of his rights under the "public safety
exception."193 In this case, officers knew that the defendant was a potentially violent suspect, possibly possessed a firearm, and they reasonably
believed that other individuals may have been in the house where they
arrested him.194 As such, they were justified in asking the defendant if
there was anything in the house "that could hurt my guys before we go
in."195 Regarding the defendant's later statements, after he was advised
of his Miranda rights, the court held that the defendant's statement that
he did not "agree with" the officer's statement that the defendant was
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Id. at 1099–1100.
931 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1254–55.
Id. at 1255–56.
Id. at 1254.
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willing to talk without a lawyer present, and the defendant's initial hesitance to sign a waiver, did not constitute an "unambiguous or unequivocal" invocation of the defendant's right to counsel or to remain silent. 196
In United States v. Feldman,197 the court considered as a matter of first
impression whether the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause
barred a defendant's retrial or whether the defendant's conviction at the
first trial (and later reversal) based on one theory of the offense resulted
in an "implied acquittal" which barred another prosecution based on the
same charges but a different theory of the offense.198 Faced with two options on the verdict form at the first trial, both reflecting the Government's alternative theories of the case, the jury chose to convict the defendant of money laundering based on the Government's theory that he
was transmitting and receiving funds internationally, as opposed to the
alternative theory that he committed money laundering by concealing
payments.199
After the Eleventh Circuit reversed the defendant's money laundering
conviction on other grounds, the Government charged him again and retried him based on its concealment-of-payments theory of the offense.200
The defendant argued that his prosecution on the concealment-based theory of money laundering was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the jury at his first trial "did not find that he was guilty under that
theory," which constituted an "implied-acquittal."201 The court noted that
it had previously held that a jury finding guilt under one theory of the
offense, when a single count charges two different theories, does not bar
retrial if the jury fails to reach a verdict about the alternative theory and
a mistrial results.202 Here, however, the jury had found the defendant
guilty of one theory but was silent on the other.203 The court concluded
that this non-finding did not function as an implied acquittal under these
circumstances, given that the conviction based on the first theory did not
logically disprove the second theory, and that the defendant could not
argue that jeopardy was terminated because the jury at the first trial was
dismissed "without returning any express verdict," and the defendant
had implicitly consented to their dismissal. 204
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The court also considered the issue of juror misconduct. In United
States v. Brown, a police brutality case, one of the defendants argued that
the jury that convicted him had been unduly prejudiced against him. 205
Specifically, the defendant filed a post-verdict motion requesting that the
trial court voir dire a juror who alleged that several of the other jurors
were biased due to "prior misconceptions about police officers" and had
made up their minds before deliberating. 206 On appeal, the court affirmed
the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that the allegations reflected "internal matters" by the jury that are inadmissible under
Rule 606(b)207 and did not fall under the exceptions identified by the Supreme Court in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado208 or any of the four exceptions identified by Rule 606(b)(2)(A)–(C).209 The court also held that the
juror's allegations that she and others were bullied into voting guilty, and
that she was made fun of for having a "crush" on the defendant, merely
reflected "[a] typical feature[] of jury deliberations." 210
C. Sixth Amendment Issues
The court published several opinions addressing Sixth Amendment 211
issues, especially those involving the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, which ensures a defendant's right to confront the witnesses
testifying against him or her.212 In United States v. Smith,213 for example,
the court examined whether the defendants' confrontation rights had
been violated when the district court admitted the videotaped deposition
of one of the aliens allegedly smuggled into the country on the defendants'
boat.214 Initially, the parties had agreed to admit the witness's videotaped
deposition based on the assumption that she would be deported back to
Haiti and unavailable at trial, a shared expectation that was dashed
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205. 934 F.3d at 1303.
206. Id.
207. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
208. 137. S. Ct. 855 (2017).
209. Brown, 934 F.3d at 1302–03.
210. Id. at 1303.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
212. Id.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
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Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1223–24.
Id. at 1227 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980)).
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1230.
922 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1286–87.
Id. (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)).
Id. at 1287.
Id.
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when it turned out that the witness was accidentally released rather
than deported.215
The defendants appealed the trial court's admission of the videotaped
deposition over their objections, but the Government argued that it had
made good faith, reasonable efforts to locate the witness, which included
visiting her relatives and contacting her lawyer.216 The court held that,
under prior Supreme Court precedents, whether the witness was "unavailable" under the Confrontation Clause was "a question of reasonableness"217 that is "fact-specific and examines the totality of the factual circumstances of each particular case."218 Here, the court concluded that the
Government had done enough to show the witness was unavailable, especially given her "obvious determination to go into hiding and elude capture."219
The court also addressed the defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge in United States v. Hano,220 which revolved around the admissibility of a non-testifying co-defendant's statement to a witness that he and
the defendant participated in the robbery of an armored truck.221 For the
first time in a published opinion, the court held that the "Bruton doctrine," which "prohibits the use of the confession of a nontestifying criminal defendant in a joint trial if the statement directly inculpates a codefendant," applies only to "testimonial statements." 222 Since the
non-testifying co-defendant in this case made the statements in question
when "no future prosecution was on the horizon," he was "not presently
under investigation and had no reason to believe that his statement[] . . .
would ever be used in court," and the witness "had no ground to suspect
that he would ever testify" against the defendant, the statements were
"plainly nontestimonial."223 Rather, the court explained, the statements
were merely part of a "friendly and informal exchange in which [the defendant] happened to reveal evidence that would ultimately be critical to
the government's case."224
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225. United States v. Cooper, 926 F.3d 718, 727 (11th Cir. 2019).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 728. The defendant was convicted, among other things, of wire fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2020), importing an alien for an immoral purpose under 8 U.S.C. § 1328
(2020), and sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2020).
228. Id. at 730.
229. Id. at 730–33.
230. Id. at 730–31.
231. Id. at 731–32.
232. Id. at 732.
233. 913 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2019).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2020).
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In another case involving foreign witnesses, the court again affirmed
a defendant's conviction over his Confrontation Clause challenge. 225 In
United States v. Cooper,226 the defendant was convicted of defrauding a
government work-exchange program in order to bring female students
from Kazakhstan to work for him in Florida as sex workers. 227 At the
trial, the case agent testified that the female victims, who had since returned to Kazakhstan, refused to return for trial or give deposition testimony because they feared further humiliation and stress. 228 The trial
court also allowed the agent to testify regarding the incriminating statements of men who were interviewed after signing visitor logs at the
apartments where the victims worked and that one of the victims had
identified the defendant's voice during a monitored phone call. 229
Regarding the agent's testimony relaying the victims' explanations for
not wanting to return to testify, the court on appeal noted that the defense opened the door for this testimony by cross-examining the agent on
why the Government could not procure the witnesses for trial and held
that, either way, the agent did not offer testimonial statements since
their reasons for refusing to testify did nothing to establish a fact relevant to the charged offense or the defendant's guilt. 230 And while the
agent's testimony regarding the statements made by the defendant's clientele were testimonial, since they were made in response to investigative questioning, the error was harmless given other evidence showing
how the defendant used the apartments. 231 As for the agent recounting
the victim's authentication of the defendant's voice on the monitored call,
the court held that the victim's statements were admitted to give context
to the defendant's statements, not the truth of the matter asserted, and
the Confrontation Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements
for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." 232
The court also issued a few noteworthy opinions regarding the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. In Brewster v. Hetzel,233 involving a prisoner's motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,234 the court held that the
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defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object or move for
a mistrial after the trial court repeatedly coerced a holdout juror into
voting guilty.235 The court first determined that the trial court's conduct
amounted to juror coercion—the trial court had issued an Allen236 charge,
instructed the jury on three subsequent occasions to continue deliberating despite jurors repeatedly complaining that they were "really, really
deadlocked," told the jury to take their oaths "seriously" when informed
that the holdout juror was refusing to continue discussing the case, and,
upon being told that the lone holdout had begun playing crossword puzzles, ordered that all reading materials be taken out of the jury room,
after which the jury eventually returned a unanimous guilty verdict. 237
The court concluded that, as opposed to the usual coercion case challenging an Allen charge or supplemental instructions, this was a "macro
claim"238 of juror coercion based on the "totality of the circumstances,"
including:
(1) the total length of deliberations; (2) the number of times the jury
reported being deadlocked and was instructed to resume deliberations;
(3) whether the judge knew of the jury's numerical split when he instructed the jury to continue deliberating; (4) whether any of the instructions implied that the jurors were violating their oaths or acting
improperly by failing to reach a verdict; and (5) the time between the
final supplemental instruction and the jury's verdict.239

Hetzel, 913 F.3d at 1059.
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
Hetzel, 913 F.3d at 1047–48.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1054–55.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
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The "cumulative effect" of the trial court's instructions, the court held,
was to send a message to the lone holdout to "stop being so stubborn and
fall in line."240 The court further concluded that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial or at least object to the trial court's
coercive conduct, and while the court did not draw a bright line establishing when trial counsel should have objected, it noted that the deliberations lasted for several days, the number of jurors holding out decreased over that time, and it "doesn't take Clarence Darrow to
realize . . . that jury [was] not headed toward an acquittal." 241 Under
these circumstances, "there was no conceivable reason, no reasonable
strategy, for sitting silent and seeing how things would turn out." 242
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941 F.3d 452 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 455, 487.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 486.
928 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1269–71.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2020).
Khan, 928 F.3d at 1272.
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The court also criticized defense counsel's inaction in Jefferson v.
GDCP Warden,243 holding that trial counsel's performance during the
penalty phase of a capital murder trial was constitutionally deficient
where counsel failed to adequately investigate the defendant's mental
health.244 Specifically, defense counsel had failed to follow up with their
retained psychologist's "unambiguous written recommendation" to seek
a neuropsychological evaluation of the defendant to explain the defendant's "mental health and behavior at the time he committed the homicide."245 The court also held that this mitigating information could have
helped the defendant at the penalty phase of the trial since the evidence
that was presented "was brief and weak," without any significant discussion of his mental impairment.246
As the court held in Khan v. United States,247 not all inaction by defense counsel rises to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness. 248 In
Khan, trial counsel for the defendant moved for leave to conduct depositions of people in Pakistan based on the charges against his client for
providing material support to the Taliban in Pakistan. The district court
granted the motion but required that trial counsel prove that the Pakistani government consented to the depositions or was aware of them, after which defense counsel communicated with the Pakistani government
but could not get a formal answer or consent—nor could the Government.
When the defense began showing these depositions during trial, the video
signal "was abruptly lost," and the trial court essentially found that the
Pakistani government was responsible. The trial court warned the defense that it could attempt to reestablish the connection with Pakistan,
but that the trial would move forward the next week regardless. Trial
counsel failed to restore the connection, his motion for mistrial was denied, and the defendant was convicted. 249
On appeal from the district court's denial of the defendant's motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,250 the court held that defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to comply with the district court's order to obtain
the formal permission of the Pakistani government in order to conduct
the depositions.251 The court noted that defense counsel had been in
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"uncharted territory" and, under the objective standard in Strickland,252
he had acted reasonably in attempting to secure the Pakistani government's consent, including traveling to Pakistan and consulting with Pakistani government officials, who indicated to him that formal approval
wasn't necessary.253 The court added that the district court's order did
not establish a "duty" on defense counsel, but rather imposed a condition
in the event defense counsel sought to take a particular action. 254 Based
on the unique circumstances of the case, trial counsel's failure to abide
by that condition and pursue an alternative strategy was reasonable. 255
For good measure, the court also held that even if trial counsel had been
ineffective, there was no prejudice, since describing the evidence against
the defendant as "overwhelming" would have been an "understatement."256
Finally, in United States v. Valois,257 the court considered whether the
defense attorneys' dual representation of two groups of defendants during two separate prosecutions arising from the same conspiracy presented a conflict of interest.258 First, the court held that a trial court's
failure to hold a Garcia259 hearing to determine whether a defendant voluntarily waived a conflict of interest would only be reversible if there was
"an actual conflict of interest."260 Here, the court held that, though the
two groups of defendants were part of one conspiracy, there was no actual
conflict because the Government had indicted the groups separately, was
prosecuting them separately and on different days, and the defendants
were facing slightly different charges. 261
D. Criminal Procedure

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Khan, 928 F.3d at 1274–75.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1280.
915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 727.
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
Valois, 915 F.3d at 727 (citing Garcia, 517 F.2d at 277).
Id. at 727–28.
18 U.S.C. § 3297 (2020).
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Regarding criminal procedure, the court rendered two opinions in 2019
involving the limits, or lack thereof, of judicial and prosecutorial power.
In Hano, the court considered the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3297,262
which resets the statute of limitations for an offense when DNA testing
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newly implicates a suspect.263 After robbing an armored truck, the defendants took the money and ran, and it wasn't until five years later,
when law enforcement got a tip from a cooperator, that the Government
conducted DNA testing that implicated the defendants in the robbery. 264
After the Government charged them and a jury convicted them of
Hobbs Act robbery, the defendants argued on appeal that § 3297 only applies if DNA testing implicates a defendant within the original statute of
limitations period, essentially arguing that the statute only resets the
limitation period for an offense, rather than starts a new one after the
original term has expired.265 The court disagreed, citing the plain meaning of § 3297, and holding that the statute allows for the revival of an
already-expired statute of limitations when DNA testing implicates a defendant for the first time.266
The court also decided a case delineating the limits of a district court's
jurisdiction to accept a plea when the Government fails to provide a factual basis that adequately addresses how it would have been able to
prove each element of the offense.267 Distinguishing an offense's "jurisdictional element" from a district court's "subject matter jurisdiction," the
court in United States v. Grimon268 reiterated its prior holdings that "the
government's failure to sufficiently allege or prove the interstate commerce element does not deprive the district court of its subject matter
jurisdiction over the criminal case."269 It was sufficient for the parties to
stipulate as to the jurisdictional element requiring proof of the effect on
interstate commerce, since all that is required to invoke the district
court's jurisdiction over a case if an indictment "alleges a violation of a
valid federal statute."270

Among the court's many opinions concerning the Federal Rules of Evidence, there were two significant opinions reviewing the propriety of
having law enforcement agents provide trial testimony based on specialized knowledge. In United States v. Hawkins,271 for example, the court
reversed the defendants' convictions based on the district court's plain

922 F.3d at 1283.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283–84.
Id. at 1284.
United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019).
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Id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1265–66.
Id. at 1268–69 (citing United States v. Holden, 603 Fed. Appx. 744, 752 (11th Cir.
922 F.3d at 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2019).
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Delva, 922 F.3d at 1251 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
909 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327.
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error in allowing the lead case agent to give improper opinion testimony
regarding the substance of communications on the defendant's phone
calls and text messages.272 While law enforcement agents can testify as
experts in certain contexts, such as to help juries understand the drug
business or coded language, the court held that the agents went well beyond such testimony in this case by "interpret[ing]" unambiguous language, mixing expert opinion with fact testimony, and straying into
"speculation and unfettered, wholesale interpretation of the evidence." 273
When the Government argued on appeal that the agent had testified
merely as a lay witness, the court countered that the agent had been "paraded before the jury as an expert" and criticized the "indiscriminate
merging of fact testimony with expert testimony." 274 The court then detailed the difficulties and risks in allowing a lead case agent to testify as
an expert witness before explicitly admonishing the Government that
"the better practice is to avoid doing so."275
The result in Delva was much different, precisely because the trial
court had let the case agent testify as an expert in "identity theft and tax
fraud and the terminology and jargon" used by the defendants.276 The
court held that it is "well-settled" that law enforcement agents can testify
as experts "to decode criminal conversations and operations that juror
might not otherwise understand" and that the detective was properly
qualified under Rule 702277 for those purposes.278
The court also reviewed cases involving more conventional expert witnesses, such as its highly technical opinion in United States v. Barton,279
which involved an expert on DNA evidence. 280 At the trial on whether the
defendant possessed a firearm as a convicted felon, the Government introduced expert testimony regarding DNA evidence linking the defendant to the firearm.281 On appeal, the defendant argued that the Government expert's methodology was unreliable because the expert failed to
conduct a validation study on the DNA sample, which included the DNA
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282. Id. at 1332.
283. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
284. Barton, 909 F.3d at 1328.
285. Id. at 1333–34.
286. Id. at 1334. In a separate part of the opinion, the court rejected considering the
defendant’s newly available evidence regarding the guidelines and validity of DNA testing,
holding that it was not in the record and the district court couldn’t have abused its discretion by failing to consider evidence that was not available at the time. Id. at 1335.
287. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
288. 938 F.3d at 1190.
289. Id. at 1191–92.
290. Id. at 1192.
291. Id. at 1192–93.
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of at least three other individuals, and because the amount of DNA material was below the established threshold and thus unreliable. 282
At the Daubert283 hearing before the magistrate, the Government's expert had testified that she adhered to international and FBI standards
and other professional guidelines, and while she admitted that the
amount of DNA was less than "optimal," she was still able to draw reliable conclusions from the amount she tested. 284 The court affirmed the
qualification of the Government's expert, noting that her testing met
well-accepted standards for testing DNA and that the defendant had not
presented any evidence indicating that the results would have been different had the expert conducted validation testing or had a bigger sample
to test.285 The defendant's arguments, the court explained, went to how
much "weight" the jury should give the Government's expert's testimony,
not its reliability.286
In United States v. Gillis, where the defendant was charged with enticing a minor and other offenses, the court reviewed whether the trial
court had deprived the defendant of his rights by limiting the testimony
of one of his expert witnesses and, under Rule 704(b),287 prohibiting the
testimony of another under.288 Citing a lack of peer review and credibility
under Daubert, the court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting the defense's expert's testimony to the ways people
socialize online as opposed to the defendant's request to allow his expert
to testify regarding "internet sub-culture for fantasy role-playing and
sexual communications."289
The defendant also argued that his other expert should have been allowed to testify regarding his "psychosexual makeup" and "sexual development."290 He argued that, "even if technically inadmissible under the
rules governing expert testimony," the testimony should have been admitted "because it was necessary to negate the subjective intent element"
of his kidnapping and attempt to entice charges. 291 The court rejected
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these arguments, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion in limiting or prohibiting the expert testimony where it would
have gone to the defendant's state of mind under Rule 704(b) and the
defendant had not demonstrated any "compelling reasons for exceptions
to the rules of evidence."292
The court issued several other opinions grappling with the scope of
Rule 704(b), which prohibits experts from opining on a defendant's state
of mind when it is an element of the offense. 293 As in Gillis, the defendant
in United States v. Stahlman sought to introduce expert testimony that
the defendant did not intend to have sex with an actual minor, but rather
that he intended to act out a fantasy involving consenting adults. 294 The
court held that such testimony would clearly run afoul of Rule 704(b) but
noted that an expert can testify regarding "the difference, generally
speaking, between real-life attraction to children and online fantasy and
role-playing" and whether the defendant has been diagnosed with "any
psychiatric condition that was associated with a sexual attraction to children."295
Rule 704(b) came up in United States v. Caniff as well, where the court
held that a law enforcement officer's testimony that he found "evidence
of illegal activity" on the defendant's phone (text messages requesting
child pornography) was not inadmissible under Rule 704(b), though it implied the defendant's state of mind by referencing its illegality. 296 The
court noted that Rule 704(b) did not apply because the detective was not
qualified as an expert and even if he had been, his testimony did not expressly address the defendant's mental state. 297
IV. SENTENCING

As it does every year, the court spent a lot of time in 2019 reviewing
defendants' sentences and clarifying how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be applied. The court's opinions involving the Guidelines in
2019 tended to fall into two categories: opinions addressing the proper
application of specific, conduct-based provisions and opinions addressing
the procedure for applying the Guidelines.

Id. at 1194–95.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
934 F.3d at 1220–21.
Id. at 1221–22 (citing United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
916 F.3d at 940.
Id. at 939.
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943 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2019).
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) (2020).
Perez, 943 F.3d at 1330–31.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2020).
Perez, 943 F.3d at 1335.
Id. at 1333–35.
920 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2019).
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4) (2020).
Gordillo, 920 F.3d at 1296, 1300.
Id. at 1300.
940 F.3d at 1250 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2020)).
Id. at 1250 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A) (2020)).
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The first category of opinions involves questions regarding how specific Guidelines enhancements or provisions apply to discrete sets of
facts. In United States v. Perez,298 for example, the court reversed the
sentencing court's application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F),299 the enhancement for making threats of death during a robbery.300 While acknowledging that all bank robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)301 involve
some form of violence or intimidation, the court held that "something
more" is required to transform a "general threat of harm inherent in
every bank robbery . . . into a threat of death."302 Applying an objective
test to determine "whether the defendant's overall conduct would have
instilled the fear of death in a reasonable person," the court held that the
defendant's written notes to the bank tellers demanding that they put
money in an envelope "and no one will get hurt" were insufficient to warrant the enhancement.303
The court also issued a pair of published opinions involving Guidelines
enhancements in firearms cases. In United States v. Gordillo,304 the court
held that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4),305 which applies when an offense involves a "semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine," was properly applied where the defendant's firearms
were kept in "close proximity" to the magazine, even though the firearm
was in a locked case while the magazine was in a separate bag across the
room.306 The court reasoned that "close proximity" is based on "physical
distance" and "accessibility" and explained that the defendant had failed
to argue that the gun and magazine were not readily accessible based on
being kept in separate containers.307
In United States v. Bishop, the question was whether the district court
properly applied the enhancement for "possessing a firearm in connection
with another felony offense—namely, possession of one hydromorphone
pill."308 Under the Application Notes, the enhancement automatically applies based solely on a firearm's proximity to drugs if the felony in question is a drug trafficking offense.309 Otherwise, the court must find that
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Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B) (2020)).
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2020).
Id. at 1252.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5 (2020).
United States v. Bankston, 945 F.3d 1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1319 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.5, cmt. n.1 (2020)).
945 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1319.
939 F.3d at 1236.
Id. at 1237–38.
Id. at 1238.
921 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019).
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) (2020).
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the firearm "facilitated or had the potential to facilitate" the felony offense.310 The court reversed the sentencing court's application of the enhancement because the defendant's possession of one pill was not a drug
trafficking offense and "mere proximity between a firearm and drugs possessed for personal use cannot support the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)311 enhancement without a finding that the gun facilitated or had the potential to
facilitate the defendant's drug possession." 312
Beyond firearms, the court also reviewed the applicability of U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.5313 for using body armor during a drug trafficking crime or crime
of violence.314 The Application Notes to § 3B1.5 define "using" body armor
as "active employment in a manner to protect the person from gunfire"
or "as a means of bartering."315 In United v. Bankston,316 the court held
that the defendant selling body armor did not constitute "using" body armor since, under the common usage and dictionary definition of the word,
to "barter" is to trade goods or services without money.317
It wasn't all drugs and guns at the Eleventh Circuit, however, as the
Court issued an important opinion regarding the proper method for calculating loss amounts in fraud cases in United States v. Annamalai,
where the loss amount was derived from the number of credit card disputes by followers of the defendant's Hindu temple. 318 In reversing the
district court, the court noted that only a small subset of the disputes
included records detailing the reasons for the dispute, and some of the
same individuals disputed certain charges from the temple while approving others.319 The court rejected the IRS agent's testimony that these disputed charges reflected a "pattern of fraud" and held that extrapolating
the documented credit card disputes to include all of the disputes in the
loss amount was "a step too far" and unduly speculative. 320
In United States v. Corbett,321 the court considered the number-of-victims enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i),322 which applies
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323. Corbett, 921 F.3d at 1035.
324. Id. at 1038 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (2020)).
325. Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 704 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013)) (punctuation
omitted).
326. Id. at 1038–39.
327. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) (2020).
328. 928 F.3d at 1336.
329. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) (2020).
330. Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1336–37 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), cmt. n.4 (2020)).
331. Id. at 1337.
332. 926 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2019).
333. Id. at 1280 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) (2020)).
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when the offense involves ten or more victims. 323 Under the Application
Notes, victims in identity fraud cases are defined as those "whose means
of identification were used unlawfully or without authority." 324 The court
held that the sentencing court committed plain error when it counted as
"victims" all of the individuals who had their identities stolen through an
unauthorized transfer by the defendant, holding that the "mere sale or
transfer" of their identifications was not "equivalent to its actual use." 325
The court explained that a defendant "uses" another person's identification when they adapt it as a means of identification to procure something
of value.326
The court also published a couple of opinions clarifying the scope of
certain enhancements applicable in sex offense cases. In United States v.
Whyte, the court held that the enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)327 for unduly influencing a minor to engage in sexual
conduct applies even where the minor in question has previously engaged
in prostitution.328 The court also affirmed the sentencing court's application of the enhancement for using a computer to "entice, encourage, offer,
or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor"
based on the defendant's use of a smartphone to facilitate the minor for
prostitution, despite the commentary to § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B)329 stating that
the enhancement only applies when a computer is used to "communicate
directly with a minor or with a person who exercised custody, care, or
supervisory control of the minor." 330 The court held that the application
note was "patently inconsistent" with the plain language of the Guideline.331
Meanwhile, in United States v. Fox,332 the court held for the first time
that the enhancement for a defendant who engages in a "pattern of prohibited sexual conduct" can apply even when the defendant engages in
such a pattern with only one minor victim. 333 The court noted that the
plain language in the commentary lends itself to an interpretation that
the enhancement can apply to prohibited sexual conduct involving the

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 50 Side A

05/29/2020 07:30:56

[4] CRIMINAL CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/20/2020 8:29 AM

CRIMINAL LAW

1001

Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1277.
923 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 930, 935.
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b) (2020).
Spence, 923 F.3d at 930.
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2020).
Spence, 923 F.3d at 932–33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661).
934 F.3d at 1307.
Id. at 1305.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 50 Side A

same minor and, despite the language of the commentary defining a pattern as involving "at least two separate occasions," the enhancement can
also apply when the acts are related. 334 Here, the district court properly
applied the enhancement to the defendant's conduct, which included
abusing one of his granddaughters on multiple occasions over the course
of a year.335
The other category of opinions issued by the court addressed whether
and how sentencing courts should apply the Guidelines on a broader
level. Sometimes, the question was geographic in nature. In United
States v. Spence,336 the court held for the first time that the sentencing
court can consider extraterritorial conduct when calculating a defendant's Guidelines range.337 The defendant was arrested after arriving in
the U.S. from Jamaica with a phone that contained child pornography,
and the district court enhanced his offense level under U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2(b)338 based on the defendant having "distributed" the images by
showing them to people in Jamaica. 339 Despite the presumption against
extraterritorial application of congressional legislation, the court held
that the district court properly considered the defendant's extraterritorial conduct, explaining that the conduct was relevant for assessing the
gravity of the offense, the Guidelines are silent on extraterritorial conduct, and other sentencing statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3661,340 state
that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct" of defendants sentenced in federal
court.341
In United States v. Brown, the court held that, for the purposes of determining which Guideline to apply to a defendant, a sentencing court
can consider that the defendant acted with more than one intent. 342 In
Brown, a police brutality case, the sentencing court erred in declining to
apply the Guideline for aggravated assault after finding that the Government failed to prove that the defendant-officer used a taser on the victim
intending to cause bodily injury "rather than to gain control over [the
victim]."343 The court vacated the defendant's sentence, holding that a
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defendant can have more than one intent when committing an act, and
remanded for the district court to determine whether the defendant acted
with the requisite intent to apply the Guideline for aggravated assault. 344
The court also held as an apparent matter of first impression that
clear-error review applies to a finding regarding U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2's345 definition of a defendant's intent.346
The court also clarified the admissibility of certain forms of evidence
for purposes of calculating the Guidelines. In United States v. Baptiste,347
the court held that inadmissible hearsay testimony can be used to calculate a defendant's Guidelines range so long as there is "sufficient indicia
of reliability to support its probable accuracy." 348 The court also clarified
that a district court is not required to make explicit findings about the
reliability of such hearsay statements if "the reliability of the statements
is apparent from the record."349 That was the case here, where the witness's hearsay testimony went against her self-interest, a "traditional indicia of reliability."350
The court also explained how the Guidelines apply when a defendant
with multiple counts of conviction has a Guidelines range that exceeds
the statutory maximum.351 In United States v. Kirby,352 the court held
that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d)353 directs courts to impose consecutive terms for
multiple counts of conviction when "the sentence imposed on the count
carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the [ordinary guidelines recommendation] . . . but only to the extent necessary to produce a
combined sentence equal to the [ordinary guidelines recommendation]."354 Since the defendant's Guidelines range called for life, but his
counts of conviction were capped at ten, twenty, and thirty years, the
sentencing court properly added the counts together to calculate a Guidelines range of 1440 months in prison, which it imposed.355
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Finally, it's worth noting that the court in Lester v. United States356
voted against granting a rehearing en banc. 357 This left in place a prior
panel opinion holding that, since the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not
apply to the Guidelines, the residual clause of the Career Offender provision of the Guidelines is not vague based on Johnson v. United States,358
even for defendants who were sentenced before Booker,359 when the
Guidelines were mandatory.360 This opinion leaves in place what is essentially a bright line rule that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not
apply to the Guidelines.
Respecting the denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Pryor wrote that,
notwithstanding the vagueness argument, the rule in Johnson was not
retroactive to pre-Booker sentences anyway, since the sentencing court
would retain the power "to impose exactly the same sentence as before."361 Judge Martin dissented, arguing that vagueness challenges
should be allowed for sentences that were imposed under the mandatory
Guidelines because they had "the force and effect of laws" and that it was
inconsistent to apply Johnson retroactively to ACCA convictions but not
career offender sentences imposed under the then-mandatory Guidelines.362
V. CONCLUSION
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356. 921 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2019).
357. Id. at 1307.
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Many of the opinions issued in 2019 brought much-needed clarity to
particularly challenging or murky areas of law. Several of the court's
other opinions will likely be looked back upon one day as the starting
point for further development of the law. Some of the cases may even be
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court and find themselves back in the
Eleventh Circuit on remand. Time will tell.
As always, however, it is crucially important that prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and judges keep their fingers on the pulse of our legal system
and stay up-to-date on recent developments in the law. While the need to
stay current on the law is important for all lawyers, it is especially true
for those who practice in the criminal justice world, where lives and livelihoods are on the lines every day. Whether setting new precedents or
fighting to get others overturned, we should all strive to remember that.
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